The Central European Nations and the EU Waiting Room - Why Must the Central European Nations Adopt the Competition Law of the European Union by Fox, Eleanor M.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 23
Issue 2
Symposium:
Creating Competition Policy for Transition
Economies
Article 2
12-1-1997
The Central European Nations and the EU Waiting
Room - Why Must the Central European Nations
Adopt the Competition Law of the European
Union
Eleanor M. Fox
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Eleanor M. Fox, The Central European Nations and the EU Waiting Room - Why Must the Central European Nations Adopt the Competition
Law of the European Union, 23 Brook. J. Int'l L. 351 (1997).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol23/iss2/2
SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN NATIONS AND
THE EU WAITING ROOM-Why Must the
Central European Nations Adopt the
Competition Law of the European Union?
Eleanor M. Fox*
I. INTRODUCTION
Seven years have passed since the democracy revolutions
transformed the societies and the economies of the Central
European countries (CEECs). Moving from communism to
democracy and from command-and-control economies to mar-
kets, the nations adopted competition policy as an important
element for and after the transitions. They embarked upon
privatizations, restructurings, lowering barriers to trade, creat-
ing incentives for business firms to compete and perform, and
organizing competition offices to police the rules of the game.
By these and related policies, the nations sought to develop
healthy economies, to integrate their economies with those of
trading partners, to stabilize political relations, and also to
legitimate freedom of enterprise by putting a lid on "greedy"
exploitations by powerful firms. The nations strove to reform
their economies both by initiatives "from the top"--
privatizations and break-up of the huge, inefficient state
owned monopolies, and by initiatives "from the bot-
tom"-fostering entry, growth, and responsive behavior by
entrepreneurs.
At the dawn of this new era many Americans urged the
post-communist nations to adopt U.S. style antitrust rules,
while Europeans suggested that the competition law of the
European Community (EC) provided a better fit. The European
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model, which offers greater concern for open markets and busi-
ness opportunity, promised an anchor of stability from the ship
of a friendly neighbor, a basis for more fluid trade with West-
ern Europe, and an entr6 card to the European Union (EU).
The American model, which focuses on the consumer and on
optimal output, offered the virtue of less government when
government itself had been the devastating problem, and,
possibly, it offered a shorter track to efficiency.'
This stage of the debate is now over. The CEECs have
adopted laws drawn largely from the model of the EU. Seeing
their economic growth and economic and political well-being
linked to Western Europe, most of the CEECs have entered the
waiting room for membership in the EU and have signed Eu-
rope Agreements.2 Under the Europe Agreements, the CEECs
agree to adopt EC competition rules for matters affecting trade
or competition with the EU.3 Further, each promises to change
its own national law so as to "approximate" the competition
law of the EC.4 EU officials have stated that in principle the
CEECs will be accepted as Members of the EU; that they will
be admitted as soon as they are ready democratically, institu-
tionally, and economically (though recent financial and mone-
tary crises that must be resolved among the current 15 Mem-
bers of the EU may suggest a longer time frame). Success of
the CEECs in approximating EC law is understood to be a
critical factor in reaching the state of "readiness" for member-
1. For a comparison of U.S. laws and European Community (EC) law on
abuse of dominance, see Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the
United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981, 987-90 (1986).
2. The Europe Agreements are a series of association agreements that the
EC entered into with various CEECs pursuant to the authority granted in Article
238 of the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C
224) 1 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. See Roger J.
Goebel, The European Community and Eastern Europe: "Deepening" and "Widening"
the Community Brand of Economic Federalism, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 163, 218-23
(1993); see also Association Agreements with the Countries of Central and Eastern
Europe: A General Outline, Angence Europe, Eur. Does. No. 1646/47 (Sept. 7,
1990).
3. See, e.g., Europe Agreement establishing an association between the Euro-
pean Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of
Poland on the other part, Dec. 16, 1991, art. 63(1)-(3), 1993 O.J. (L 348) 2, 16
(1993) [hereinafter Poland Europe Agreement]. Poland's Europe Agreement will be
used for illustrative purposes throughout this article. The same provisions are in
the other Europe Agreements, but are differently numbered.
4. See, e.g., id., arts. 68-69.
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ship in the EU.
This essay looks at the virtues and costs of the EC require-
ment that the CEECs national laws "approximate" EC law. It
looks at the significance of approximation both in the specific
European context and in the context of the dialogue on harmo-
nization and convergence of the law of trading partners of the
world.
In this essay I describe the Europe Agreements and the
CEECs obligations thereunder to "approximate" EC law. I then
briefly describe the competition laws of the four nations direct-
ly to the east of Germany and Austria, all thought to be seri-
ous candidates for admission to the EU soon after the turn of
the century-Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic (hereafter called the Visegrad countries, so
named after a summit conference in that Hungarian city). I
then consider how closely the competition laws of these nations
have converged with the EC competition laws. Next, I discuss
the wisdom of forced convergence, and finally I comment on
the benefits conferred by EC oversight and pressure for compe-
tition policy.
II. THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS AND THE WHITE PAPER
The Europe Agreements apply to transactions affecting
commerce with the EU or any of its Members. They contain
provisions to safeguard free movement of goods, services, capi-
tal and workers-provisions adopted from the basic economic
blueprint for the EC as set forth in the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (EC Treaty).' Also, as in the EC Treaty,
the Europe Agreements provide for economic, cultural and
financial co-operation; non-discrimination in public contracting;
and adoption of EC competition rules for the free trade area.
The Europe Agreements expressly require that any practices
contrary to the competition rules be "assessed on the basis of
criteria arising from the application of the rules of [the EC
Treaty]. 6 Further, the Europe Agreements state:
[tihe Contracting Parties recognize that the major precondi-
tion for [e.g.,I Poland's economic integration into the Commu-
nity is the approximation of that country's existing and future
5. See supra note 2.
6. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 3, art. 63(2).
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legislation to that of the Community. Poland shall use its best
endeavors to ensure that future legislation is compatible with
Community legislation.'
It is this provision that requires the CEECs to harmonize their
national competition laws with those of the EU. No such obli-
gation is imposed on the Member States of the EU, which have
the right to retain the competition law of their choice.
There is room for debate about the construction of the
word "approximation" in the quoted article of the Europe
Agreements.8 The European Commission's White Paper on
Enlargement (White Paper)' takes the view that approxima-
tion means transplanting EC competition law into the CEECs'
national law. The White Paper acknowledges that the EU
Member States themselves have no obligation to align their
domestic law with EC law."0 It notes, however, that EC law is
directly effective within the Member States (i.e., it is automati-
cally a part of the Member States' national law whenever
Member State trade is affected), and EC competition law is
enforced by a central authority."
The White Paper continues:
For the CEECs, the situation is obviously different [from the
situation in the Member States]. An obligation for approxi-
mation was considered indispensable because there could be
no extension of Community law to them as is the case for
Member States. Such an approximation is therefore neces-
sary inter alia to ensure that economic operators can be sure
to act on a level playing field, and in order to prepare the
CEECs' economies for future membership."
Turning to the level of detail required by the concept of
"approximation," the White Paper states that "the key ele-
7. Id, art. 68 (emphasis added).
8. See id.
9. White Paper, Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and East-
er Europe for Integration into the International Market of the Union,
COM(95)163 final [hereinafter White Paper]; see also Addendum: Annexe to White
Paper, Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for
Integration into the International Market of the Union, COM(95)163 final/2 [here-
inafter White Paper Annex].
10. See White Paper annex, supra note 9, at 59
11. See id. at 58.
12. Id. at 59.
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ments" of EC competition law must be put into place in the
CEECs; and that EC group exemptions and notices "must...
be considered as constituting key elements of the Community
competition system."3
Several arguments support the requirement of approxima-
tion and the broad construction urged by the White Paper.
First, it is argued, that it is necessary for the CEECs to adopt
EC competition law to make them ready for membership. Sec-
ond, it is necessary to assure a level playing field for Western
European business. Third, since EC law is not automatically a
part of CEEC national law even where cross-border effects
occur, and since there is no central system for enforcement of
the EC principles, it is necessary to establish a mechanism to
bring EC law into the legal systems of the CEECs.
Fourth, it is thought, approximation will be good for the
CEECs. The CEEC economies are so small, and so many of
their transactions will affect trade with the EU, that it would
be unduly burdensome if not impossible for a Central Europe-
an nation (having agreed to apply EC rules in the free trade
area) to maintain two sets of rules and regulations in tandem.
Two necessary assumptions and one normative conclusion
underlie these arguments. The first assumption is that the EC
competition rules are as good as or better than any other possi-
ble set of competition rules. The second assumption is that no
special tailoring of the EC rules is needed or appropriate for
transition economies (or for these transition economies). The
normative conclusion is that Western Europe needs (or is enti-
13. See id at 58. The group exemptions and notices are "secondary legisla-
tion" of the EC. They establish many rules. The level of detail is great and is not
necessarily dictated by coherent competition policy. For example, group (or block)
exemptions are provided because, under the EC system, exemption by the Europe-
an Commission is required to establish the validity of agreements that have at
least a minimal possibility of affecting competition. The group exemption system
allows automatic exemption for contracts that fit a certain blueprint. Block exemp-
tions specify lists of required clauses, permissible clauses, and prohibited clauses.
However, the prohibited clauses do not always coincide with harm to compe-
tition; the permissible clauses do not represent a full list of clauses that are pro-
competitive or benign; some permissible clauses may be anticompetitive and vice
versa. This over and under inclusiveness is a predictable result of a system over-
whelmed by notifications on which the competition agency must act. The block
exemptions reflect the search for common transactional forms that can be given a
presumptive "seal of approval" without individual scrutiny. See GEORGE A.
BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, & ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 729-32 (1993).
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tied to) a "level playing field." While the rationale for a "level
playing field" entitlement is not spelled out, the concept appar-
ently reflects a Western European fear that CEEC businesses
will be in a position to out-compete Western European firms in
Western Europe if trade barriers go down but the CEECs have
not replicated EC competition law. The theory is that cartel or
monopoly profits, state aids, or even efficiencies achieved in
the domestic market by practices forbidden in the EU 4 but
not in the CEEC will subsidize or enable low pricing in West-
ern Europe. The assumptions are not necessarily true, and the
normative conclusion is controversial.
III. THE COMPETITION LAWS OF THE VISEGRAD NATIONS
All four of the Visegrad nations have laws against restric-
tive contracts and abuse of dominance, and merger control.
They prohibit cartels, anticompetitive collaborations, resale
price maintenance, and exclusionary and restrictive vertical re-
straints. Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics amend-
ed their statutes to assure coverage of vertical restraints. All
four nations' abuse of dominance laws now, after amendments,
nearly track Article 86 of the EC Treaty (although, unlike EC
law, they concentrate on excessively one-sided bargains). Domi-
nance is presumed at 30% or 40% market share. Mergers must
be notified and are to be prohibited if (in some nations) they
impair competition or (in other nations) they create or en-
trench dominance, unless (in three nations) economic advan-
tages to the nation outbalance the anticompetitive effects.
The laws are interpreted to protect market actors from
unfair abuse, to help create markets, and to facilitate the
growth of small and middle-sized firms. 5
14. Certain principles of EC competition law could prevent Eropean Union
(EU) firms from achieving maximum efficiencies in their distribution systems. See,
e.g., Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R.
299, 340-45 (1966) (agreements that strictly limit distributors of a single
manufacturer's product to a specific Member State and prevent other distributors
of the same product from selling in that Member State violate Article 85 of the
EC TREATY, despite potential for such agreements to improve market efficiency).
15. See JOHN FINGLETON, ELEANOR Fox, DAMIEN NEVEN, & PAUL SEABRIGHT,
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 114-47
(1996).
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IV. HARMONIZATION
Approximation of CEEC law to EC law must be seen in a
larger context. The larger context is the discussion surrounding
harmonization of the laws of trading nations of the world so as
to break down barriers to trade and tend towards a more near-
ly integrated world economy. Some observers and policy mak-
ers state the ultimate objective of harmonization as merely an
increase in the flow of trade and investment, with resulting
lower costs to intermediate buyers or consumers. Others see
the objective as the formation of "community," entailing mutu-
al respect of peoples and a more promising environment for
peace. Harmonization tends to facilitate market integration,
whereas the existence of many different systems of law, with-
out bridges and interfaces, can tend to breed isolationism and
lack of understanding.
Much has been written about the enterprise of harmoniza-
tion. It has been argued by some that harmonization is essen-
tially wrong-headed on grounds that it involves a relinquish-
ment of sovereignty of nations, and that domestic or lower-
level solutions are more likely than multinational solutions to
serve the people of the participating nations and to be tailored
to their particular needs. On the other hand, harmonization
has the virtue of increasing trade flows by eliminating unnec-
essary transaction costs and putting businesses from different
nations on the same "track."
Harmonization could have the virtue of moving the world
towards "better law," in that the process of harmonization
involves conversation and information flows and is often a
process of enlightenment. But harmonization can have the
pitfall of degrading law, because agreement may be possible
only at the lowest common denominator; because harmoniza-
tion to a sub-optimal standard may be forced by one country on
another; or because conditions may change and, in a world of
mandated common principles of law, adaptation is difficult to
achieve.
In some areas of law the claim for harmonization is much
stronger than in others. The claim is strongest where, as in
environmental law, there are pervasive externalities, and
where the protection of values that a society chooses to protect
entails high costs in a world of disparate law. The claim is less
strong in competition law than in regulatory areas such as
1997] 357
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environmental law for four reasons. First, competition law is
not essentially cost-raising, as is law requiring investment in
environmental controls; it is essentially market-freeing and
cost-lowering. As a result, there is no perceptible race to the
bottom (degrading one's law to attract capital), and the argu-
ment-We pay the costs of antitrust; therefore you should
too-is based on the false premise that antitrust in essence
imposes costs on business. Second, externalities (e.g., from off-
shore cartels) can usually be controlled by accepted uses of the
effects doctrine; that is, nations can legitimately apply their
law to foreign actors who intend to harm and do harm com-
merce within the regulating nation.
Third, only certain antitrust rules have a distinct impact
on trading relations. Anticompetitive conduct with direct trade
effects includes, particularly: competitor cartels dividing mar-
kets at borders, and anticompetitive market access restraints.
Market access restraints can be horizontal (cartels with boy-
cotts), or vertical (e.g., exclusive dealing or refusals to deal in
concentrated high barrier markets where the restraints pre-
vent outsiders from getting to market or from doing so at a
competitive price). Also, anticompetitive discriminations by
buyers or sellers with market power (e.g., public procurements)
have a distinct fit with trade law where the discrimination
favors nationals. Mergers and monopolistic conduct with ex-
ploitative spill-over effects abroad are also matters of more
than national concern. On the other hand, rules protecting
fairness, such as rules against one-sided bargains, do not hurt
trade.
Fourth, most nations have or are adopting competition
laws, and the laws are relatively similar. Where antitrust-
related trade friction exists, it is not because of lack of harmo-
nization of competition laws. The differences in formulation of
principle virtually never produce trade friction, even though
the differences are often based on different values (e.g., wheth-
er the law should protect fairness and small business). The
friction is most commonly produced by non-enforcement of
existing law.'6
16. See Eleanor M. Fox & Janusz A. Ordover, The Harmonization of Competi-
tion and Trade Law-The Case for Modest Linkages of Law and Limits to Parochi-
al State Action, 19 WORLD COMEPETITION L. & ECON. REv. 5, 8-9, 11-29, 33-34
(1995).
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"Soft" harmonization is often beneficial, for it implies and
is the result of conversation and learning and the tendency of
nations to adapt their methods to those that they come to view
as better. But, as the foregoing analysis implies, there is not a
strong case for a more aggressive project for harmonization of
the competition laws of nations-even among equal nations.17
V. APPROXIMATION
The enterprise of harmonization as applied to Central
Europe is yet more complex. First, at the moment of the recent
democracy revolutions, the CEECs did not start with a devel-
oped competition law; they started more or less with a clean
slate. Therefore, there is no project to harmonize two sets of
existing laws. Second, the European Union not only had and
has a developed law, but the approximation it envisions is
approximation to its law; a unilateralist version of harmoniza-
tion.
One might expect that the CEECs, with no pressure at all,
would be happy to adopt the general open-market, no abuse
principles of the EU into their own competition laws; one
would expect them to choose general competition principles
similar to those of the EU.
But might a CEEC prefer not to adopt the detail of EC
competition law, or not to adopt selected details; or might it
prefer simply to retain the right to choose what if any details
to adopt?
First, for the sake of autonomy, a nation may cherish the
sovereign right to choose. To be sure, by their decisions to
apply for membership in the European Union, the CEECs
effectively declared themselves prepared to do what is neces-
sary and appropriate to ready their economies for membership.
But adoption of a number of the details of EC competition law,
including obligations regarding distribution of products and
details specified in block exemptions, may be perceived as
having no link to trade or efficiency; and since detail itself may
burden a newly evolving system, the requirement of approxi-
17. There is a much stronger case, however, for the internationalization of a
few consensus competition principles that lie at the intersection of trade and com-
petition. See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forg-
ing the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 1, 29-33 (1995).
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mating the detail of EC law may be perceived as weighing
down rather than lifting up the effort to establish appropriate
and enforceable law.
Second, the CEECs may prefer a set of details tailored to
their own economies. For example, some nations may wish to
elevate the efficiency goal, and may believe that their business
firms are likely to become viable and stronger faster under
rules focused on this goal. Alternatively, they may wish to
stress equity, and they may wish to apply equity principles
(e.g., against excessively one-sided contracts) even when the
alleged abuse is of no concern under EC competition law.
VI. OPEN ARCHITECTURE FOR MARKET INTEGRATION
The White Paper urges that approximation even on detail
is necessary for several reasons,18 most particularly, that ap-
proximation will ensure uniformity of competition principles
(viz., the EC principles) in matters affecting trade, and that it
will move the CEECs toward market integration with the EU.
Therefore, it remains to be asked: Had the Europe Agreements
simply required CEEC acceptance of EC law for the free trade
area, would lack of a CEEC obligation to accept EC principles
as their national law have hindered market integration objec-
tives?
In embarking on this inquiry it is important to recognize
four points. First, competition rules against private restraints
are not the only or even the main mechanism for liberalization
that facilitates market integration. Most of the weight belongs
on GATT-type"8 disciplines on governments such as those im-
posed by EC Treaty Articles 9, 12, 30, 59 and 60.2"
Second, trade liberalizing competition policy is a small
piece of competition policy. One would not write a comprehen-
sive competition law if one's objective were only to remove
blockages to trade and to move one nation's economy along a
path towards integration with another economy. This is so
because competition offenses are comprised of both
exclusionary and exploitative conduct, and much of the exploit-
18. See supra Part II.
19. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
20. These articles deal with freedom of movement of goods and services. See
generally EC TREATY, arts. 9, 12, 30, 59, 60.
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ative conduct is not exclusionary, and much of the exclusionary
conduct is local and does not extend to or cross national bound-
aries. Even a nation-wide price-fixing cartel-which is serious-
ly anticompetitive-would not (absent government barriers)
undermine trade and integration unless the cartel were accom-
panied by a boycott against imports. Rather, the high cartel
price would trigger a flow of trade.
Third, if antitrust prohibitions are overbroad they can
retard the development of efficient, procompetitive activity that
itself can facilitate trade.
Fourth, it follows that a sound competition policy will
catch all trade-restraining anticompetitive restraints, and a
sound trade policy would not demand more of a nation's com-
petition policy.
A simple competition law would thus satisfy all require-
ments for trade and competition that may reasonably be ex-
pected of national competition law.
Yet it is argued that failure to duplicate EC rules designed
to promote the free flow of parallel imports, as well as the
failure to adopt the EC block exemptions, would be a sign of
inhospitality towards market integration. To be sure, the EU
has a strong policy to protect the flow of parallel imports. The
policy gave birth to the rule of Consten and Grundig2 ' and
many related rules that restrain a producer in deciding how to
distribute its own product, even when the producer faces
strong competition. The EC rules put into tension the- dual
objectives of freedom of firms to pursue efficiency, and the free
flow of goods across borders. The EU itself has produced a
discussion paper and is reexamining its law on point, for it is
not clear that the EC rules do, as intended, advance market
integration.
In any event, if there were a perceived gap in national law
regarding border restraints inhospitable to market integration
(e.g., if failure of a CEEC to adopt the Consten and Grundig
principle22 into national law was deemed hurtful to market
integration goals), enforcement of EC law would close the gap.
If Cepelia, seller of Polish folk arts and crafts, licensed a Ger-
man distributor to sell Cepelia products in Germany only, and
21. See supra note 14.
22. See supra note 14.
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if the German distributor wished to sell to Polish as well as
German buyers, the restraint imposed by Cepelia would literal-
ly restrain EU's outbound trade. Under the Europe Agree-
ments, the principles of EC law are applicable. The EU could
seek enforcement of the Europe Agreement obligations by the
Polish Antimonopoly Office, and, failing Polish enforcement,
the European Commission could enforce EC law directly
against Cepelia.' Clearly, EC law would apply to Cepelia's
agreement to keep parallel imports out of Germany.' The
important point is that all trade-related restraints are subject
to scrutiny under EC law.
In sum, competition law loosely harmonized in principle to
EC competition law, combined with national obligations to
apply EC competition law in the free trade area, would seem to
provide the "open architecture" necessary for market integra-
tion.
VII. THE REALITY OF THE TASK OF APPROXIMATION
The EU might indeed have not required the CEECs to
copy EC law into their national systems. But they have done
so, and we now have six years of experience under the obli-
gation to approximate. What observations can be made about
the benefits or detriments of the task? I use the Visegrad na-
tions as my sample.
First, all of the nations took their obligations seriously.
They changed their statutes progressively, to approximate EC
law, and they studied and often adopted EC case law prece-
dents. They had visits from and visited the European Commis-
sion. They worked with EC experts (and others), learning from
them. The heads of the Antimonopoly Offices sometimes were
23. In enforcing its own law, the European Commission would face possible
jurisdictional problems regarding the scope of EC law as applied to acts taken
outside of the EU that impact only EU outbound trade. This should not pose
difficulties. The CEEC parties to the Europe Agreements, like the members of
European Free Trade Area (Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein), have agreed to be
subject to the principles of EC competition law where EU trade is affected. See,
e.g., Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 3, art. 63(2). The countries have the
obligation to make these principles legally binding on their nationals and to en-
force the principles. See, e.g., id. If the CEECs fail in these obligations, it is a
small step to allow the EU, in effect, to enforce the obligations by direct applica-
tion of EC law.
24. See Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125-129/85, Ahlstr6m Osakeyhtid
v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5240-43 (1988).
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able to rely npon their obligations to approximate in urging
pro-competition policies for their nation. As a result, the voice
for competition became stronger than it might otherwise have
been.
Second, one of the nations in particular expressed difficul-
ties with adopting certain EC principles, and argued for the
right to pursue more liberal policies in the area of vertical
restraints;' but eventually all of the nations conformed more
or less with the EC law, though adoption of block exemptions
was more spotty, and the White Paper obligation to adopt the
block exemptions was apparently not pressed.
Third, European Commission authorities did press the
Visegrad nations to adopt virtually all of the EC prohibitory
rules, but apparently did not express concern when the nations
adopted laws that were significantly more prohibitory than the
law of the EC; e.g., the law against dominant firms' imposing
excessively one-sided contracts."
VIII. CONCLUSION
With respect to the CEECs, the European Union chose a
course of unilateralist harmonization. This route had two seri-
ous downsides: (1) the CEECs lost their freedom to choose and
tailor competition law to their needs; and (2) parts of EC com-
petition law are probably not optimal for CEEC needs. The
choice had one major advantage; the nations have developed a
much greater commitment to competition policy than would
probably otherwise have been the case.
The validity of the market integration and "readiness for
membership" rationales for forced harmonization are theoreti-
cally unconvincing. In fact, however, the communications,
interactions and pressures surrounding the approximation
obligation and process proved to be of major importance in the
effort to begin to connect the CEEC economies with that of the
EU in a positive, open-market sense.
25. Cf. Ferenc Vissi, Challenges and Questions Around Competition Policy: The
Hungarian Experience, 18 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1230, 1239-44 (1995).
26. For a critique of the Visegrad countries' allocation of most of their compe-
tition resources to correcting one-sided bargains and similar "unfair abuses," see
FINGLETON, FOX, NEVEN, & SEABRIGHT supra note 15, at xiv, 139-41, 178.
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